Under the Ethiopian constitution, the state is the proprietor of the countrys land and natural resources, which gives the government significant control over the allocation and use of land. In addition, no independent, multilateral Environmental and Social Impact Assessments has been carried out suggesting that Ethiopia is reneging from the 2015 Declaration of Principles (Kandeel, 2020). Practically from the outset, the World Bank and international donors withdrew funding due to a lack of transparency, driven home when it was learned that the construction had begun without a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency in Ethiopia. It could be a treaty or merely a political declaration as the name implies. While this means new opportunities to develop extended irrigation-based agriculture for the Sudanese, it represents also a new threat for Egypts current Nile water utilisation (Whittington et al., 2014). Four of these would potentially be located on the main river and one would eventually evolve into the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). On Foes and Flows: Vulnerabilities, Adaptive Capacities and Transboundary Relations in the Nile River Basin in Times of Climate Change. Ethiopian general threatens military force to defend Nile dam as negotiations with Egypt falter. However, as a result of the ability and willingness of Ethiopians at home and abroad to invest in the dam project, the government was able to raise a significant portion of the money needed to start the construction of the GERD. However, an agreement was still far from reach. The GERD has the potential to act both as driver for conflict, but also for cooperation. But this did not rule out eruptions of tension, not just between local communities and the central government, but also between Ethiopia and its neighbours. Ethiopia is pinning its hopes of economic development and power generation on the Blue Nile dam, which Egypt fears will imperil its water supply. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a 6,450 MW hydropower project nearing completion on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, located about 30 km upstream of the border with Sudan. What Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia must overcome to all benefit from the Grand Renaissance Dam. Swain, A. The toll on the local communities affected by the dams has been enormous. The decisions that this group renders must be binding on all riparian states. "The Blue Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt and its people and critics fear the dam could significantly reduce water flow to the country." "Climate change is such a big unknown. Negotiations resumed three weeks after Al-Sisi took office in June 2014, and an agreement was made to resume negotiations - an achievementhailed by both Egypt and Ethiopia as a new chapter in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia based on openness and mutual understanding and cooperation (Omar, 2014). This represents a new challenge to the basins current hydro-political regime and status quo, as it may drive Sudans interest in renegotiating its current quota(Link et al., 2012;Whittington et al., 2014). However, this threatens the basin's long-term sustainability (as water use expands beyond what is environmentally feasible) and suboptimal in terms of capital allocation (as higher water use upstream may make downstream projects uneconomical (Swain, 2011). After announcing the dam's construction, and with a view to the increasing tensions, the Ethiopian government invited both Egypt and Sudan to form an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) to solicit understanding of the benefits, costs and impacts of the GERD. l Coordinates 111255N 3505 . DISADVANTAGES OF ASWAN DAM the agriculture output of Egypt. In an effort to forestall potential water conflicts such as the one brewing around the Dam, an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral water agreements have been concluded in recent decades. Since its inception, there have been two, highly contentious, products. As mentioned above, Ethiopias dam-construction strategy is intimately linked with large-scale foreign investment in the agrarian sector and specifically in areas near the artificial reservoirs created by the dams. A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. The New Arab (2020a). This article quantifies the major benefits of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project for Sudan and Egypt based on GERDP technical design and quantitative analysis. "The Israeli installation of the missile system around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was completed after the Israeli work began in May 2019, considering that it is the first Israeli air defense system abroad that can launch (two types of missiles), the first with a range of 5 km, and the second with a range of 50 kilometer". However, as noted above, the trouble with relying on the DoP is that its legal status is not clearly defined. These countries should return to the NBIs Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was concluded in 2010, try to resolve the disagreements that caused Egypt and Sudan to decline to sign the CFA, and use it as a model for a future binding legal regime. The Nile is not a boundary-delimiting river, hence Ethiopia would almost certainly argue that the exception should not be applied here. 74 cubic metres. The researchers looked at the dynamic interactions between the Nile's hydrology and infrastructure and Egypt's economy. Crucially, however, despite being signed by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, the legal status of the DoP was left (deliberately) vague. Officials in Addis Ababa argue that the GERD will have no major impact on water flow into the Nile, instead arguing that the hydropower dam will provide benefits to countries in the region, including as a source of affordable electric power and as a major mechanism for the management of the Nile, including the mitigation of droughts and water salinity. Article IV of the DoP provides that the parties shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable manner and Article III provides that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm in utilizing the Blue/Main Nile. Ethiopia can make a strong case that the operation of the Dam complies with each principle. According to this narrative, the Blue Nile, or Abay in Amharic, is a purely Ethiopian river. If the relevant parties can agree to these goals, the agreement, in the end, will need to include technical language that ensures equitable sharing of the Nile. In response, Ethiopia threatened military force to defend the dam and protect its interests (The New Arab, 2020a). In the modern era, the US used water to blackmail Egypt. The disadvantages for Egypt and Sudan are the possibility of reduced river flow, although this is only really a problem during the years of filling the dam. It concludes that Ethiopias legal position is far stronger and that a negotiated agreement in its favour is the most likely outcome of the dispute. In that light, Egypt should minimize trips to Washington, D.C., New York, and Brussels, and instead use its diplomatic resources to improve its relations with the other riparian states. It also codified the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation and no significant harm (essentially importing from the Watercourses Convention). Recently, the tensions among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile have escalated, particularly after Ethiopia announced that it had started filling the GERDs reservoir, an action contrary to Egypts mandate that the dam not be filled without a legally binding agreement over the equitable allocation of the Niles waters. Egypt, fearing major disruptions to its access to the Nile's waters, originally intended to prevent even the start of the GERD's construction. There are three key articles. This was an attempt at a wholesale replacement for the Nile Waters Treaties. First, Ethiopia could highlight that it was not a party to either the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty or the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Treaty. March 14, 2020, 6:57 AM. The official narrative is that Ethiopia can uproot poverty and bring about a definitive end to social and economic underdevelopment by means of the construction of a series of mega-dams combined with the development of the national energy infrastructure. Given these considerations, it seems that Ethiopia has all but won the dispute. Despite the intense disagreements, though, Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelectric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly. Typically, treaties contain provisions on the identification and function of the depositary, entry into force, adoption and so on (Article 24(4) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)). Such an understanding and appreciation of Egypts water vulnerability would help the riparians develop a water management protocol that can significantly enhance equitable and reasonable use while minimizing significant harm to downstream riparians. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. It signifies that Egypts de facto veto power on major upstream dams has been broken, and it clearly demonstrates the political will of Ethiopia to develop its water infrastructure even in the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement. The dispute over the GERD is part of a long-standing feud between Egypt and Sudanthe downstream stateson the one hand, and Ethiopia and the upstream riparians on the other over access to the Niles waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of people living in Egypt and Sudan. On March 4, 1834, the town of York in the British colony of Canada was incorporated as the City of Toronto. This exception was implemented to mitigate the risk of decolonisation leading to boundary wars. A series of talks since then have largely failed to produce a consensus among the concerned countries, with tensions rising again after Ethiopia announced its intention to begin filling the dam in July 2020. Although Egypt and Sudan are likely to resist efforts to include the other upstream riparians in the negotiations or to allow a regional organization, such as the NBI, to serve as an implementing organ, they must understand that the Nile River is a regional watercourse and its management must be approached from a regional perspective. Kandeel, A. Since 2015, technical reports on the potential impacts of the dam have failed to reach a consensus within the TNC (Maguid, 2017). In contrast, if water from the Dam were to be used for irrigation purposes by Ethiopia (i.e. Finally, Ethiopia could make a strong case that the operation of the Dam is in alignment with the core principles of international water law, namely equitable utilisation and no significant harm. These are found in Articles 5 and 7 of the Water Courses Convention respectively and, despite the scepticism outlined above, arguably form part of customary international law. Another important area of cooperation is research, especially in areas like climate change, the fight against terrorism and extremism, and human rights. It imports about half its food products and recycles about 25 bcm of water annually. Ethiopia could argue that those imperial powers did not foresee the decolonisation of Africa and that this represented a watershed event that profoundly changed the foundation on which the Nile Water Treaties were constructed. Indeed, Principle II notes that the purpose of the [Dam] is for power generation and regional integration through generation of sustainable and reliable clean energy supply. This is crucial given that hydroelectricity generation simply involves holding water back behind a dam for a period of time, and then releasing it again in a managed manner so that the electric turbines can spin consistently. The multi-services provided by the hydropower development and its technical advantages could be driving forces for local, regional and national development, and a catalyst for sustainable development. These parallel developments appear to be elements of a bigger hydro-political strategy wherein the riparian countries aim to increase their water utilisation to put facts on the ground (and underpin legal claims based on those uses) and increase their bargaining position for renegotiations of volumetric water allocations. Moreover, it arguably prohibits any reduction of flow to Egypt by limiting Ethiopias use of the Dam to electricity generation alone. But controversy has surrounded the project ever since it was announced in 2011 especially concerning its . This is because it is traditionally understood to refer to waterways that form intrinsic parts of international boundaries. One question that keeps coming up is: Will Ethiopia be willing to release enough water from the reservoir to help mitigate a drought downstream? In fact, the Dam arguably smooths out the flow and mitigates the risk of both drought and floods. As they consider this controversial issue, all 11 riparian countries should seek to improve relations among themselves beyond their relationship with the Nile, especially in mutually beneficial areas such as trade; educational and cultural exchanges; the management of natural resources, including water; dealing with threats to peace and security, including the suppression and prevention of terrorism and extremism; and confronting major challenges to economic growth and poverty alleviation, such as climate change, widespread illiteracy, and poor infrastructure. For example, in 2017, the UNSC highlighted the security risks of water stress in the Lake Chad Basin Region, affecting Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, based on a combination of water scarcity, drought, desertification and land degradation. Salman, S.M.A. The dispute escalated in 2011 when Ethiopia began construction of a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), in the absence of any agreement with downstream Egypt. Third, Egypt should abandon continued references to its so-called natural historical rights (i.e., the water rights granted Egypt by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan). [35] First came the 1999 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Ethiopia should get its fair share of water that originates in Ethiopia. The Nile riparians must understand that the river is a common resource whose effective management must be approached from a basin-wide perspective. Further, it means that this figure should be used to assess the impact of the Dam on the Egyptian economy for the purposes of calculating compensation resulting from loss of flow. Revisiting hydro-hegemony from a benefitsharing perspective: the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Attempts to resolve the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute over the past decade have reached a deadlock. AFRICANGLOBE. Owned and operated by the Ethiopian Electric Power company, the 145-m-tall roller-compacted concrete gravity dam . Indeed, Egypt has called the filling of the dam an. Elliot Winter is a lecturer (assistant professor) in international law at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom. All three countries have a vested interest in a properly operated dam. Match facts: Egypts Ahly v South Africas Mamelodi Sundowns (CAF Champions.. Kevin Harts first Egypt show cancelled 'due to local logistical issues', Match facts: Sudans Al-Hilal v Egypts Ahly (CAF Champions League), Match facts: Egypts Ahly v Cameroons Coton Sport (CAF Champions League), Egyptian Premier League results & scorers (20th matchday), Spain La Liga results & scorers (21st matchday), 13 Egyptian women on Forbes Middle East 100 Most Powerful businesswomen 2023, Egyptian Premier League results & fixtures (18th matchday), English Premier League results & scorers (23rd matchday), Prioritising the best solutions for sustainable development, A new beginning for education and beyond, Prioritizing the UN's Global Development Agenda, US-Africa Leaders Summit: Between expectations and realities. Test. Egypt says. This is hardly a revelation, as this strategy has long been foremost in the minds of the ruling elites in Addis Ababa and supported by the international powers. The Chinese then took over the funding amidst heightened international concern regarding the social, technical, and environmental repercussions of the Ethiopian dams. Ethiopia also seems to have the political upper hand given that the Dam is effectively a fait accompli and given that Egypts erstwhile downstream ally, Sudan, switched sides in the dispute leaving the Egyptians diplomatically isolated. Therefore, a negotiated position that favours Ethiopia is likely to be reached once it becomes politically palatable enough inside Egypt. Feb 11th 2021 DAMS HAVE several uses. Second, the upstream riparian states must recognize and accept Egypts near total dependence on the waters of the Nile River. Egypt's 100 million people rely on the Nile for 90% of the country's water needs. The 1959 agreement allocated all the Nile Rivers waters to Egypt and Sudan, leaving 10 billion cubic meters (b.c.m.) Ethiopia, with a population of more than 115 million people and Projected to be 230 million by 2050. This crisis has raised great concerns among large sectors of the Egyptian society, especially in light of recalling such statements as "water war," "water militarization," "military management of the GERD crisis," "water terrorism," and "Ethiopian hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin" [ 1, 2 ]. If Egyptian authorities refuse to abandon these anachronistic treatieswhich have created untenable water-use rights that benefit only itself and Sudanall parties will remain at an impasse. His successor, Mohamed Morsi, said that Egypt was prepared to defend each drop of Nile water with blood. An armed conflict has not emerged, but there are suggestions that Egyptian intelligence services undermined Ethiopia internally by assisting the Oromo Liberation Front in its campaign of civil unrest in Ethiopia in 2016. The failure of the latest talks over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has intensified tensions between Ethiopia and downstream states Egypt and Sudan. You can revoke your consent to the site operator at any time by unsubscribing from the newsletter. [35] The lack of international financing for projects on the Blue Nile River has persistently been attributed to Egypt's campaign to keep control on the Nile water share. The Nile waters have historically been governed by the Nile Waters Treaties. These colonial-era agreements comprise (i) the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty (with the UK representing modern-day Sudan); (ii) the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (with the UK representing modern-day Kenya and Uganda) and (iii) the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Treaty (with the UK now absent as a result of decolonisation). For a decade, Egypt and Ethiopia have been at a diplomatic stalemate over the Nile's management. Indeed, as Tekuya notes, Ethiopia persistently objected to the 1929 and 1959 treaties and made clear that its failure to exploit the Nile resulted from a lack of capacity rather than a lack of a legal right to do so. 67K views 6 months ago ETIOPIA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, is located around 14 km upstream of the Ethiopian-Sudan Border, at around 700 km from the Capital. l located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia . The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is estimated to cost close to 5 billion US dollars, about 7% of the 2016 Ethiopian gross national product. These conflicts could take the form of international armed conflicts (between states), non-international armed conflicts between a group and a state, or conflicts between non-state groups. Although talks chaired by President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on behalf of the African Union have resolved many issues associated with the filling of the GERDs reservoir, there is still no agreement on the role that the dam will play in mitigating droughts. Rendering of GERDEthiopia is building one of the largest dams in the world, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), on the River Nile near the Sudan border. Ultimately, however, Egypt did not sign the CFA (nor did Sudan) hence it does not resolve the dispute. Such a meaningful resource-sharing agreement should not only resolve the conflict over water-use rights among the riparian states, but it should help define concepts such as equitable and reasonable use and significant harm, which have been used by the downstream states in their criticisms of the GERD. Therefore, all the water is eventually released downstream with the effect that there is no net loss of water to downstream states. Still, Egypt may be playing with fire if it were to press the legal significance of the DoP. It too has legal arguments it could adduce in support of its position that the Dam is permitted under international law. Yet, Ethiopia is fully aware of Somalias economic dependence on the rivers originating from Ethiopias highlands.

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